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In both 2017 and 2018, the state legislature 
passed bills seeking to reform California’s 
Housing Element Law.1  More recently, Gov. 
Gavin Newsom indicated he intends to reform 
the law further, saying that the law as currently written 
enables a statewide approach to housing of “neglect and 
denial.”2 
What is the Housing Element law, and why is it 
attracting so much attention? This issue brief introduces 
the law and highlights a sometimes misunderstood 
feature of its core planning tool: the Regional Housing 
Needs Assessment (RHNA) process. We focus in 
particular on how RHNA addresses the production of 
income-restricted, affordable housing. In doing so we 
emphasize a fundamental problem with RHNA: It creates 
needless tension between subsidized and market-rate 
housing, and as a result generates too little of either. 
We suggest a solution that separates the goal of having 
cities carry a “fair share” of affordable housing from the 
goal of building enough housing to accommodate future 
growth. Specifically, we think the state should simplify 
its fair share requirement, and mandate that every city 
carry an equal percentage of income-restricted housing 
and make space for an equal rate of new housing 
growth.
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HIGHLIGHTS
• RHNA numbers are not true “housing needs” — 
they are the result of a political process in which 
affluent cities lobby to keep their numbers low.
• The RHNA process asks cities to plan for more 
than 10 times the amount of subsidized housing 
that can be funded. 
• RHNA bases “housing needs” on projections 
of population, rather than prices. As a result, it 
steers housing production away from places 
where housing is most expensive, and new 
development most necessary.
• RHNA needlessly pits market-rate and affordable 
housing against one another, when both are 
necessary to advance affordability.
• RHNA can be improved and simplified, and some 
northeastern states offer a model for reform. 
Rather than engage in a complicated process 
of prediction and allocation, California should 
simply require that all cities build a “fair share” of 
affordable housing.
BACKGROUND
The Housing Element Law has two goals. It primarily 
seeks to ensure that cities zone for enough new housing 
to accommodate future population growth. But it also 
tries to ensure that some of that zoned capacity for 
housing is specifically for income-restricted, subsidized 
affordable housing. The way it does so, however, is 
convoluted and — until recently — largely toothless. 
The RHNA process has three stages. First, the state 
Department of Finance and regional Councils of 
Government, in consultation with the Department 
of Housing and Community Development, project 
population growth and household formation for each 
region in the state. Then, each region, through its 
metropolitan planning organization, allocates a portion 
of this projected housing “need” to its constituent cities. 
This process involves not just assigning projected units 
to each city, but also subdividing those units by income 
groups (e.g., each city will “need” a certain number of 
low-, middle- and higher-income housing units). These 
final figures are the cities’ RHNA numbers. Lastly, the 
cities must then revise the Housing Elements of their 
General Plans to demonstrate they have more than 
enough zoned capacity to accommodate this number of 
housing units.
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This process is problematic for at least two reasons.3 
First, little thought is given to how these needed units 
— especially the affordable units — might be built. To 
say that there isn’t enough public subsidy to build all 
the income-restricted housing that the state deems 
necessary is a wild understatement. The fifth RHNA 
cycle, covering 2013–2021, estimated that California 
would need over 665,000 income-restricted units, 
or roughly 80,000 affordable units per year.4 A 2015 
report from the Legislative Analyst’s Office noted that 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, 
the primary subsidy for new income-restricted 
housing, finances the production of about 7,000 units 
in California annually. Meeting our estimated need for 
affordable housing would require annual expenditures in 
the low tens of billions of dollars.5 
The second problem is in some ways a solution to the 
first problem, albeit not a good one. RHNA only requires 
that cities demonstrate, in their plans, that they have 
space that can potentially hold the needed income-
restricted housing.6 But nothing in the law ensures that 
any income-restricted housing will actually be built, 
nor that these potential sites of income-restricted 
housing must actually be reserved for that purpose. 
Municipalities uninterested in building affordable units 
are thus under no legal obligation to do so. Although 
they must show a zoned capacity for this housing in 
their Housing Element, if anyone actually proposes 
such housing the cities can simply block it through their 
usual development review process. This aspect of the 
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law is no secret. On its website, Palos Verdes Estates, 
a small, wealthy city in the South Bay of Los Angeles 
County, explains to residents that the state only requires 
potential space, not units (Figure 1).7
The predictable result of this loophole is that many cities 
don’t build income-restricted housing. The few that do 
end up carrying a disproportionate share of the state’s 
affordable housing, which exacerbates spatial inequality 
within metropolitan areas. Part of SB35, a bill passed in 
2017, involved tracking whether cities built a “sufficient 
share” of the income-restricted housing they were 
assigned during the RHNA process. Only 24 jurisdictions 
out of the state’s 540 met RHNA goals.
Another way to see the unequal distribution of income-
restricted housing is to look at where we build LIHTC 
units.8 We reviewed the production of LIHTC housing in 
Los Angeles County’s 88 cities: Thirty have constructed 
no LIHTC units ever, while 24 others have built only 
one or two buildings. The city of Los Angeles, which is 
home to roughly 40 percent of the county population, 
has 70 percent of the county’s 1,235 income-restricted 
buildings built through the LIHTC program.
To our knowledge, Palos Verdes Estates has zero 
income-restricted housing units.9 But it is in full 
compliance with RHNA. It has identified a site that 
could hold income-restricted housing, and that’s all that 
matters.
Figure 1. Excerpt from Palos Verdes Estates Online Housing Element 
Questions and Answers Document
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CAN RHNA REALLY 
IDENTIFY HOUSING 
“NEEDS”? 
Behind RHNA’s income-restricted housing loophole 
lurks a larger, conceptual problem. The RHNA process 
predicts how much housing a city “needs,” and then 
breaks that need down by price — so for example the 
2013–2021 RHNA numbers for Los Angeles said the city 
would need 46,000 units for people earning less than 
120 percent of the area’s median income, and 32,000 
units for people earning above that. 
Two problems afflict this exercise. First is that the 
RHNA numbers are not true “housing needs” — they 
are the results of a political process where cities lobby 
and, often, fight to keep their numbers low. That’s 
why Beverly Hills, which is no one’s idea of affordable, 
was famously determined to “need” only three new 
units10 of income-restricted housing between 2013 and 
2021, while other similarly sized cities and much more 
affordable cities were determined to “need” hundreds of 
units.
More generally, even if cities did not lobby, the entire 
exercise of predicting how much housing California will 
need in the next eight years is a little odd. In general, 
the market for a good is working well if anyone who 
wants the good can find it, and people who sell the 
good make enough money to keep them in the business 
(but not much more). For most markets, arriving at this 
point doesn’t require complicated prediction. No one 
knows, for example, how many eggs California will need 
to produce in the next week, or the next decade, for 
everyone who wants an omelette to enjoy it at breakfast. 
We “solve” this intractable egg problem by allowing 
farmers to respond easily to the demand for eggs. When 
egg prices rise, no one stops farmers from getting more 
eggs to market. 
The same isn’t true for housing. Prices rise, but housing 
is hard to build in expensive areas, and often hard 
to build, period. Is housing more complicated than 
egg production? Of course. But the basic point holds: 
California’s problem is not its trouble predicting the 
“right” numbers, but its myriad rules preventing housing 
from being built in places with clear demand for it. 
This point was not always obscure. RHNA was originally 
written, in part, to push back on the many restrictions 
cities had placed on housing production. In practice, 
however, RHNA became something different. By framing 
housing needs in terms of population and household 
growth, rather than prices in the existing market, RHNA 
steers policymakers away from the logically obvious but 
politically inconvenient point that housing production 
should be concentrated in places where housing is most 
expensive. Previous RHNA cycles, in fact, have arrived 
at the exact opposite conclusion – that more housing is 
needed in places where prices are lower.11
RHNA generates this mistaken conclusion because it 
looks at places that have grown slowly (because they 
restrict housing production) and then projects that 
growth will be slow there in the future. This predicted 
slow growth, in turn, leads to the conclusion that these 
cities “need” less housing. Slow growth thus becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. The process rewards rather 
than sanctions cities that refuse to build, and allocates 
housing “need” to places where housing is needed least. 
This flawed needs assessment creates a final problem. 
In subdividing housing allocations by income, the 
process creates the mistaken impression that some 
places have “enough” of certain kinds of housing. When 
combined with the requirement that cities identify 
specific sites for low-income housing, this impression 
can make market-rate and subsidized housing appear to 
be at odds with each other. 
For example, in its most recent Housing Element, the city 
of Los Angeles listed a large parcel in Hollywood as a 
site that could hold over 100 units of affordable housing. 
In 2019, however, the city approved a 950-unit mixed-
use project on the parcel, which included no income-
restricted units. The project angered some activists, 
and did so for a number of reasons, but one prominent 
objection was that Los Angeles is on track to meet its 
RHNA goals for market-rate housing. It thus seemed 
like the city was sacrificing needed affordable units for 
“unnecessary” market-rate units.12 
That logic, however, is misguided. The fact that Los 
Angeles might hit its RHNA target for market-rate 
housing should in no way suggest the city has “enough” 
market-rate housing — a simple look at the price of 
Los Angeles’ market-rate housing should tell us the 
city needs much more of it. Similarly, the fact that Los 
Angeles has zoned relatively few places as suitable for 
low-income housing should not tell us those places 
must be protected at all costs — it should tell us that 
Los Angeles needs to change its zoning. RHNA creates 
conditions where people fight over the few and 
shrinking sites where multi-family housing is allowed, 
when the real goal should be to create many more of 
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those sites.13 Zoning is not immutable, and cities can 
change it with the stroke of a pen. All that is needed is 
political will.
Pitting market-rate and affordable housing against one 
another is inaccurate and counterproductive. Both 
are necessary, and both advance the larger goal of 
affordability. Saying this does not make the two types 
of housing equivalent. It is true that income-restricted 
housing is often the only sort of new housing that can 
directly assist very low-income people, and for that 
reason income-restricted housing is essential. But 
many low- and moderate-income people live in older 
market-rate housing, and they face rising rents when 
market-rate housing is in short supply. More market-
rate housing, especially if it is built in expensive areas 
where higher-income people want to live, eases the 
pressure these households face. We cannot solely build 
market-rate housing. But failing to build it does the 
disadvantaged no favors.14 
TWO SIMPLIFYING 
REFORMS
RHNA can be improved. The problems we describe 
stem from the law being overly complex, both in its 
efforts to determine how much and where different 
kinds of housing should be built. Not all places have 
gone down California’s cumbersome path, and these 
other places offer examples we can learn from. A 
number of northeastern states, for instance, have 
enacted laws to override exclusionary zoning, and 
their model appears to have been more effective than 
California’s. Massachusetts State Law 40B, for example, 
has led to increased production of rental housing in 
job-rich areas that placed strict limits on multi-family 
housing.15 Similarly, legislative action bolstered by 
strong judicial intervention in Pennsylvania led to the 
development of more multi-family housing in suburban 
areas than in neighboring states.16
One feature of the northeastern model17 is the way 
states determine whether cities are in compliance. 
These states do not use convoluted predictions, or care 
about potential sites for housing. Instead, a city is out of 
compliance if less than 10 percent of their housing stock 
is income-restricted. And if a city is out of compliance 
developers can bypass many local reviews when 
building low-income housing. 
This approach has two straightforward benefits. First, 
it is simple. There is no need for a complex modeling 
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effort to determine “needs” every eight years. More 
importantly, it avoids politics. Without a complex 
allocation system, there is no one to lobby and nothing 
to game. Every city should have at least 10 percent 
affordable housing. This number might strike many as 
too low, but we should walk before we run. In California, 
10 percent would represent drastic improvement. In the 
last RHNA cycle, only one in 10 California cities were 
asked to zone for more than 10 percent of their stock 
as income-restricted housing. Eventually we could 
move towards the French goal of 20 percent subsidized 
housing in every municipality.18
The simplicity of this approach, and the benefits of 
removing housing targets from the local political 
process, may also be usefully applied to RHNA overall. 
Rather than asking Councils of Government to develop 
a methodology and negotiate the allocation of market-
rate growth in each city, the state could simply require 
that all cities zone for 10 percent more housing than they 
currently have. During the most recent RHNA cycle, the 
median city’s total RHNA number was roughly 5 percent 
of its housing stock. Only a quarter of California cities 
were asked to zone for growth of 10 percent or more 
in housing stock. Moreover, prior RHNA cycles have 
allocated more housing needs to cities with lower-
income residents located far from job centers. 19
A simple proportional allocation of RHNA numbers 
across cities could improve equity between cities and 
between people, and help the state meet its goals for 
infill development. Eventually, perhaps, we could move 
to a model actually based on demand, where cities with 
higher rents and prices be required to zone for more 
growth than others.
California’s state government has long recognized that 
many local governments, left to their own devices, will 
not build enough housing. The state has responded with 
a system designed to preempt municipal regulation and 
increase both the supply of housing generally, and of 
subsidized housing in particular. 
But that system has several flaws. The RHNA process 
asks cities to zone for much more subsidized housing 
than we have subsidies available to build, and cities face 
few consequences when housing they zone for goes 
unbuilt. Yet no one can live in zoned capacity — the state 
needs housing, not just planning. 
RHNA’s distribution of expected construction, moreover, 
is highly inequitable across cities. We ask poorer cities 
farther from jobs to build more subsidized housing than 
high-amenity cities where demand is high. 
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The process also pits affordable housing that we sorely 
need against market-rate housing that we also sorely 
need, on the limited number of multi-family sites in 
municipal housing elements.
Finally, the state frames housing in terms of “needs” that 
ignore market signals. This can generate the obviously 
incorrect conclusion that wildly expensive cities have 
built “enough” housing. We will know the state has 
“enough” housing when people who want it can find it, 
without carrying crushing cost burdens. That is the goal 
RHNA should be oriented around.
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